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Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992) is undoubtedly one of the most significant liberal thinkers of the 
past century. Born and raised in Vienna  in the tradition of the Austrian School,2  he held academic 
positions i.a. in London, Chicago and Freiburg, thus uniting in his vita the four principal centers of neo-
liberalism.3 His intellectual development is of special interest, since he shifts the focus of his research 
agenda several times, most notably from the field of business cycle research towards the broader field of 
social philosophy. According to this well-known “break” in his œuvre, there is a classical division in 
secondary literature, “splitting” him into the two phases: Hayek I (the business cycle theorist) and Hayek 
II (the social philosopher).4
                                                       
1 I thank for the manifold helpful comments to the audiences of the PhD Colloquium of the Research Group 
“Offenes Europa” at the University of Erfurt, of the 11th Summer Institute for the History of Economics at the 
University of Richmond and of the 2010 History of Economics Society Annual Conference at Syracuse University. 
 
2 For an analysis of the combined early influence by Friedrich von Wieser and the later impact by Ludwig von Mises, 
see Hayek (1994), pp. 54-58 as well as Caldwell (2004), pp. 141-149. 
3 See Hartwell (1995), pp. 18-20 as well as Plickert (2008), pp. 54-86. 
4 See Hutchison (1981), pp. 210-219.   2 
The present paper will try to show that this two-fold division is inadequate, or at least incomplete. Instead, 
a three-fold division seems more appropriate: here, Hayek I would again be the business cycle theorist, but 
Hayek II is seen as an ordo-liberal philosopher and Hayek III as the evolutionist philosopher. Regarding 
the time-span of the latter phases, the paper contends that the ordoliberal Hayek is to be seen in the 1930s 
and 1940s (the time of The Road to Serfdom and the founding of the Mont Pèlerin Society), whereas his 
evolutionist phase starts in the 1950s and continues to the end of his life. 
 
Of course, all such classifications are to some extent arbitrary. The proposal above is, however, not made 
with the intention of pure systematization. Instead, the reconstruction of Hayek’s ordo-liberal phase helps 
circumventing some misunderstandings concerning his overall political economy. First of all, the common 
attacks from the anacho-capitalist “camp” which depict Hayek as a covert socialist lose ground.5 Secondly, 
and related to the first aspect, Hayek’s intellectual relationship to and emancipation from his early mentor 
Ludwig von Mises can thus be better understood. Thirdly, it might also prove helpful for the 
understanding of ordo-liberalism itself, usually principally related to the names of Walter Eucken and 
Wilhelm Röpke, to reflect its topics in the light of Hayek’s work. Without intending to rule out the 
existing differences between these authors,6 it seems worth examining to distinguish between different 
types of ordo-liberalism and not to confine it to the Freiburg School proper. Such a view on Hayek and 
ordo-liberalism is not entirely new and has been proposed by authors of the Walter Eucken Institut, most 
notably Viktor J. Vanberg, Michael Wohlgemuth, Manfred E. Streit,  and Andreas Renner.7
 
 The current 
paper is to be seen as a complement to this strand of research (to the first two authors I owe a lot in my 
own academic development) and will try in addition to expand it towards the interfaces to Ludwig von 
Mises and Wilhelm Röpke. 
The paper is structured as follows: first I would like to outline what is commonly understood by ordo-
liberalism in the light of the work of Walter Eucken and Wilhelm Röpke. Next, the biographical nexus in 
the triangle Eucken-Röpke-Hayek is put forward as an indication to the manifold intellectual relationships 
between the three authors. Following this, the main section contains the reconstruction of Hayek’s ordo-
liberal phase with a focus on the role of government which he proposes in this time. In this light, the 
contrast between the “ordo-liberal Hayek” and the “laissez-faire Mises” is shown. A summary concerning 
the possible interpretation of Hayek in the light of this paper serves as an outlook. 
 
 
                                                       
5 See e.g. Hoppe (1994), pp. 68-70. 
6 See Kolev (2008) as well as Kolev (2009). 
7 See i.a. Vanberg (2003), Wohlgemuth (2008), Streit/Wohlgemuth (1997) as well as Renner (2002).   3 
2. Ordo-liberalism: Freiburg School and German neo-liberalism 
2.1. The various groups: a clarification 
As mentioned above, the university town of Freiburg in South-Western Germany constitutes one of the 
major intellectual centers of the new liberalism of the 20th century. The core of what later becomes known 
as the Freiburg School  came into being in the mid-1930s due to the academic cooperation of the 
economist Walter Eucken and the lawyers Franz Böhm and Hans Großmann-Doerth.8 The group soon 
grew by attracting many young liberal-minded economists and became seen by less liberal, historicist 
German economists as a fortress of liberalism and theoretical economics.9 In manifold underground 
circles in Freiburg, Eucken and colleagues of his developed a liberal answer to the challenges of Nazi 
economics and its foreseeable aftermath.10
 
 After 1945, members of the school became seminal for the 
liberalization reforms of Ludwig Erhard 1948 and the start of the “economic miracle” (which in their eyes 
was none) of the Federal Republic after 1949. 
The Freiburg School is certainly the most important group in the movement of renewing liberalism in 
Germany. But it was not the only one. 1950, in the year of Eucken’s untimely death, the term “ordo-
liberalism” was coined, but already the author of the term included in its definition not only Eucken and 
his school but also Wilhelm Röpke and, interestingly, Friedrich A. von Hayek.11 On Hayek, more will be 
said later in this paper. For the time being, the other groups of German liberals are worth mentioning. 
First of all, the two exiles Wilhelm Röpke and his close friend Alexander Rüstow played an important role. 
Both were ousted from Germany 1933, thus quitting the option of becoming “half-exiles” like Eucken 
and his disciples.12 Röpke moved after difficult years in Istanbul to Geneva, where he remained until the 
end of his life. He was one of the first who used the term “neo-liberal” in the German context in the late 
1930s,  thus indicating  his ambition to lay new foundations to liberalism for the 20th  century. After 
Eucken’s death, he became the major academic advisor to Chancellor Adenauer and especially to Ludwig 
Erhard. A similar, less academic and more political role was assumed by Alfred Müller-Armack, a liberal 
with a difficult past in the Nazi time, who coined the term “social market economy” and later became 
Secretary in Erhard’s ministry. Müller-Armack is called the “odd man out” in German neo-liberalism13 and 
also in this paper he is not viewed as an ordo-liberal due to the specificities of his views on cyclical policy 
and especially social policy.14
 
 
Thus the term “ordo-liberalism” is used in the following as a medium classifier, larger than the Freiburg 
School (due to the inclusion e.g. of Röpke and Rüstow) but smaller than overall German neo-liberalism 
                                                       
8 See Vanberg (1998), pp. 172-173 as well as Goldschmidt/Wohlgemuth (2008), pp. 1-14.  
9 See e.g. the obituary of Eucken by Preiser (1950), p. 241 or the quote by Historicist economist Carl Brinkmann in 
Lenel (1991), p. 12. 
10 See Rieter/Schmolz (1993), pp. 96-103. 
11 See Moeller (1950), p. 224. 
12 See Johnson (1989), p. 40. 
13 See Sally (1998), p. 122. 
14 See Lange-von Kulessa/Renner (1998).   4 
(due to the non-inclusion e.g. of Müller-Armack). The following illustration should clarify the way 














Figure 1: Subdivisions of German neo-liberalism 
 
2.2. The essence of the ordo-liberal program 
Having thus personalized the term “ordo-liberalism”, focusing in the following on Eucken from the inner 
circle and on Röpke from the outer layer, the next step is the question as to what is the seminal content of 
this school’s teachings. 
 
What is the most important characteristic of ordo-liberlism is the dichotomy which its proponents hold up 
between “economic order” and “economic process”. Economic order in its positive sense signifies the 
variety of forms in which the individuals economize. Under the term “forms” Eucken understands a 
selection out of the possible market forms in combination with the possible types of monetary system, 
differentiating between a morphology of finite number of ideal types on the one hand and the real types in 
the concrete situation on the other. Thus the economic order surrounds the economic process, thus 
constituting the “framework” or, synonymously, the “rules of the game” for the individuals who are free 
to economize within this framework (autonomous “moves of the game”). This is the positive usage of the 
term “economic order” (Wirtschaftsordnung). Eucken adds a second, normative usage with the wording 
“order of the economy” (Ordnung der Wirtschaft). In the first of his major books, the Foundations of 
Economics of 1940,15 he is preoccupied with the positive analysis, whereas in the second, posthumous book, 
the Principles of Economic Policy of 1952,16
                                                       
15 See Eucken (1940/89). 
 he commences a search on the normative plane, i.e. the search for 
an “efficient and humane” order. Unfortunately Röpke is not as explicit on these methodological aspects, 
but by and large he accepts Eucken’s positive analysis regarding the seminal dichotomy order vs. process. 











ordo-liberalism German neo-liberalsim  5 
Also, he agrees with Eucken that the rules of the game are to be set consciously, meaning that they do 
come about automatically by a process of evolution. The difference between the two authors is on the 
normative level of the principles/rules of economic policy, which is to be analyzed in the next paragraph.  
Both Eucken and Röpke develop in their morphologies (despite some minor deviances) a two-fold 
subdivision between the centrally administered economy (or command economy) and the market 
economy (or exchange economy). The economics of the interventionist “middle ways”, be it of the 
market-socialists or of Keynes, are viewed by Eucken and Röpke as unstable and doomed to 
contradictions and eventually to a conversion into centrally administered economies, very much in the 
tradition of Mises’ critique of interventionism and the spiral of interventions. Unlike Mises, however, they 
develop a sub-system of interventions (in Röpke’s wording: market-conformable) which are in line with 
the market economy and can be “digested” by it without posing serious hindrances.  
 
The normative search of an “efficient and humane” order leads Eucken and Röpke to their respective 
“third ways” (to be strictly distinguished from the interventionist “middle-ways”), i.e. their specific type of 
neo-liberalism which later became known as ordo-liberalism. These are not “middle ways” since they do 
not constitute a mix of centrally administered and market economy, but are strictly forms of the market 
economy only. Eucken finds his solution in a specific type of a market economy which he calls the 
“competitive order”. For  this order, government is to institute a set of (constitutive and regulative) 
principles which as an overall framework guarantee the “emasculation” (Entmachtung) of the economy. 
Röpke goes a step further, postulating that also competition is not an autonomous mechanism but rather a 
coordination process which itself needs a framework. This is necessary to ensure that the economy is 
“vitally satisfied” (vital befriedigt), that the ethical reserves which society needs for its cohesion and which 
are consumed by competition are filled up by the outer layer of the framework. Thus, his program goes 
beyond Eucken’s economic policy of order, instead he insists that a societal policy of order is needed to 
ensure that the market economy does not destroy its moral foundations. 
 
Eucken and Röpke both agree, however, on the theorem of the interdependence of orders. This 
proposition states that the economic order is not to be regarded as an isolated system but rather as a part 
of the overall social system, which comprises the legal order, the societal order as well as the governmental 
order. The difference above as to the breadth of the framework and of the necessary type policy of order 
refers only to the question whether the economist himself has to analyze the “data wreath” (Datenkranz): 
Eucken is rather “modest” in his interpretation, whereas Röpke “immodestly” tries to endogenize the 
interdependence in a more encompassing manner. A corollary of the interdependence theorem is the 
notion that for ordo-liberals liberty is inseparable, i.e. there a society where there is a lack of e.g. economic 
liberty cannot be viewed as a free society, even though it may formally have liberty in the governmental 
order.17
                                                       
17 On the dispute on the inseparability of liberty between Röpke and Benedetto Croce, see Röpke (1976), pp. 68-69. 
 Of special importance later in the paper will be the relationship between the economic order and 
legal order in an ordo-liberal perspective. Eucken stresses that a legal order in the sense of formal rule-of-  6 
law (Rechtsstaat) is not a sufficient condition for the coming up of the proper economic order. Instead, it 
is specific substantive  parameters of the legal order that are to be set if an “efficient and humane” 
competitive order is to arise. As an example, special measures towards liability are necessary, with the goal 
that limited liability becomes the exception and not the rule. Another example with a special importance 
for ordo-liberalism is the enactment of competition by the legal order through rules like the prohibition of 
cartels or institutions like a monopoly supervisory authority for the remaining natural monopolies in the 
economy.  As a summary, the complex interdependence of the legal and the economic order is seminal for 
understanding the ordo-liberal theory. 
 
The above-mentioned distinctions end into significant differences which the two ordo-liberals assign to 
government in their reform programs.18
 
 These will be partially depicted as a contrast to Hayek’s economic 
policy program. What is more important at this point is the stress of the ordo-liberal authors on the 
dichotomy of rules of the game (order) and moves of the game (process) and the seminal ideas 












Figure 2: Different ordo-liberal conceptions of socio-economic frameworks 
 
In the next section, an overview of the biographical interrelationships between Hayek and the ordo-
liberals Eucken and Röpke will be presented, showing the intense connections in a highly critical time, 
both for the authors’ own evolution and for neo-liberalism in general. 
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3. Hayek and the ordo-liberals: the biographical nexus 
3.1. Interface Eucken-Hayek 
Eucken and Hayek must have met on the meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Zurich 1928, since 
they present papers in the same session on “Credit and Cycles”, the memorable session which Mises 
rounds up with his summary that the Austrian theory of the cycle is the consensus theory of the German-
speaking world.19 Hayek writes in his memoir notes that he met Eucken via the intermediation of Röpke 
without mentioning the date of this encounter,20
 
 so it is possible that they might have met before Zurich.  
After Hayek’s move to London, he states that on his travels from London to Vienna he “regularly made a 
stopover in Freiburg just to visit Eucken and to keep in touch with him” 21 and attended the meetings of 
the “Ordo circle”, as he calls the upcoming school it.22 After the war, the relationship intensifies further. 
In an unpublished, but often quoted letter from Eucken to Hayek on March 12 1946, Eucken is highly 
laudable of the Road to Serfdom, seeing in its germs of his own plea for the “competitive order”, wishing 
that Hayek would be even more specific on this point.23 1947, Eucken is the only German scholar living in 
Germany who is invited and effectively joins the founding meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society24 and 
becomes, in Hayek’s words, “the star” of the conference.25 1948, Hayek on his turn becomes co-founder 
of the ORDO yearbook, the ordo-liberal journal still existing today which as late as 1991 writes on its 
cover: “with the cooperation of Friedrich A. von Hayek”.26
 
 Paradoxically, Eucken dies from a heart attack 
on a lecture tour to the LSE in March 1950, to which Hayek has invited him. 
In 1962, Hayek accepts the call from the University of Freiburg to join the faculty of economics and to 
teach economic policy. Without obtaining Eucken’s former  chair directly, he stresses already  in his 
inaugural lecture in Freiburg that he hopes to join the heritage of the “unforgettable Walter Eucken”.27
 
 
For several years, he is president and later honorary president of the 1954 founded Walter Eucken Institut. 
3.2. Interface Röpke-Hayek 
Wilhelm Röpke meets Hayek earlier than Eucken, again at a meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik, in this 
case 1926 in Vienna.28
                                                       
19 See Mises (1928/29), pp. 323-326. 
 Röpke is one of the few German economists who develops a cycle theory in line 
with the Austrian theory in the Mises-Hayek strand. As Gottfried von Haberler later states, he was not 
only seen as an intellectual peer by the Austrians but was a pioneer in the theory of the so-called 
20 See Hayek (1983/92), p. 189. 
21 See Hayek (1983/92), p. 190. 
22 See Hayek (1983/92), pp. 189-190. 
23 See Eucken (1946). 
24 See Hartwell (1995), p. 33 as well as Plickert (2008), p. 156. 
25 See Hayek (1983/92), p. 192. 
26 See the front page of the ORDO Jahrbuch, Vol. 42, 1991. 
27 See Hayek (1962/69), p. 2. 
28 See Hayek (1983/92), pp. 188-189.   8 
secondary depression, an innovation within the Austrian paradigm.29  In an interview later, Hayek 
comments on his relationship to Röpke that he sent him an own paper on the secondary depression issue 
which Röpke on his part decided not to publish in Germany.30 1937 Hayek visits the HEI in Geneva for 
his lecture tour,31
 
 Röpke joining the Institute at approximately at the same time.  
During the war the correspondence continues and 1945 Röpke’s wife translates the Road to Serfdom into 
German. In the following years, Röpke and Hayek join their organizational forces to initiate the academy 
of liberal thinkers which 1947 is founded as the Mont Pèlerin Society.32 After many years of harmonious 
cooperation in the Society, in the course of its “Hunold affair”33 Röpke and Hayek fall apart (despite the 
highly laudable address by Hayek for Röpke’s 60th birthday 1959)34 and Röpke died soon afterwards. 
Probably as a late sign of reconciliation, Hayek headed the team which publishes a new edition of Röpke’s 
œuvre 1979.35
   
 
4. Hayek II: the ordo-liberal phase 
4.1. Admissibility of phase separations in Hayek’s case 
After the reconstruction of the intense biographical ties between Hayek and the two leading ordo-liberals, 
the main part of the paper will be dedicated to the hypothesis whether some notions of Hayek’s political 
philosophy can be subsumed under the term “ordo-liberalism” in the above-mentioned sense of the word. 
 
Hayek has undoubtedly undergone a very significant evolution in his œuvre, which spans the huge time-
span from the early 1920s to the late 1980s. As depicted in the introduction, the conventional division of 
his work is the Hayek I (business-cycle theorist) vs. Hayek II (social philosopher).36
 
 Such “splits” of an 
author may perhaps entail the taste of being too schematic or superficial towards the complexity of a 
personality. Aware of these potential difficulties, I would still maintain that in Hayek’s special case, such a 
procedure is warranted. The obvious shift which he performs in the late 1930s vindicates the separation. I 
argue that, in the above terminology he shifts from an analysis of the economic process (his business-cycle 
theory) to an analysis of the economic order  (his social philosophy of markets and their institutional 
framework).  
After the lack of success against the “Keynesian avalanche”, he seems to come to the idea (which he later 
attributes to Röpke in the 1959 anniversary address) that “an economist who is only an economist cannot 
                                                       
29 See Haberler (1979/00). 
30 See Hayek (1975), pp. 12-13. 
31 See Hayek (1937/08). 
32 See Hartwell (1995), pp. 29-33 as well as Plickert (2008), pp. 127-137. 
33 See Hartwell (1995), pp. 100-133 as well as Plickert (2008), pp. 178-189. 
34 See Hayek (1959). 
35 The correspondence in the triangle Hayek-Eucken-Röpke is analyzed in Hennecke (2000) and Hennecke (2005). 
The highly interesting quotes from the letters in these publications indicate that a more detailed analysis of the 
extensive correspondence seems worthwhile. 
36 See Hutchison (1981), pp. 210-219.   9 
be a good economist”.37
“I have come to feel more and more that the answers to many of the pressing social questions of 
our time are to be found in the recognition of principles that lie outside the scope of technical 
economics.”
 In the introduction to his opus magnum The Constitution of Liberty which he 




Thus the Hayek I phase can be classified in  his own perspective as a phase at least  in  need  of  a 
complement which it finds in the decades of Hayek II. 
 
4.2. Hayek II vs. Hayek III: first approximation 
But is Hayek II enough? Is it an intellectually homogenous time-span? 
 
The answer to this question is no. Interestingly, Hayek states in a foreword to a new edition of the Road to 
Serfdom of 1976: 
“… a fault which is perhaps pardonable when it is remembered that when I wrote, Russia was our 
war-time ally – and that I had not freed myself from all the current interventionist superstitions, 
and in consequence still made various concessions which I now think unwarranted.”39
 
 
What is meant by “current interventionist superstitions”? One possible answer is the intellectual heritage 
of his first mentor in Vienna, Friedrich von Wieser, who was more of a Fabian social democrat than a 
classical liberal.40
 
 But that is only one possible answer. How about a look at the upcoming ordo-liberal 
thought as a source for the “interventionist superstitions”? 
That might be the case. As mentioned above, Hayek often made stops at Freiburg in the late 1930s what 
might also be of interest here. His later attitude to “Ordo circle” as he calls it is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, he is highly laudable of Eucken, mentioning him in The Constitution of Liberty as one of the seminal 
personalities for his own development.41 On the other hand, he maintains that the circle (except Eucken 
himself) was a group of “restrained liberalism”.42
 
  
Can ordo-liberalism be seen as the source of Hayek’s self-proclaimed early interventionism? A tentative 
positive first answer seems plausible. I would not, however, insist that the influence comes directly from 
Eucken or Röpke. Instead, the early Chicago School of Frank Knight and especially Henry Simons43
                                                       
37 See Hayek (1959), p. 26. 
 
38 See Hayek (1960/78), p. 3. 
39 See Hayek (1976/94), p. XXIV. 
40 For detailed information on Friedrich von Wieser’s vita and œuvre, see Hayek’s obituary of Wieser in Hayek 
(1926/92), pp. 108-125. 
41 See Hayek (1960/78), p. 415. 
42 See Hayek (1983/92), p. 190. 
43 For the special biographical nexus of Hayek to Henry Simons, see Van Horn/Mirowski (2009), pp. 140-158.   10 
deserve a closer look.44 Simons on his part has an influence on Eucken and the upcoming Freiburg 
School,45 so an “ordoliberal Hayek” is coming up at that time, the two channels which form him might be 
Freiburg and early  Chicago. In this paper, Chicago has to stay  outside and the focus is on the 




So what are the first germs of ordo-liberalism alias “interventionist superstitions”? 
 
4.3. Ordo-liberal germs in the 1930s 
The “Years of High Theory”, as G.L.S. Shackle calls the 1930s, are the most important decade in Hayek’s 
vita. 1931 he obtains his position at the LSE and starts the (eventually unsuccessful) battle against Keynes 
and Cambridge economics. Then in 1935 his volume on socialism ignites the second phase in the socialist 
calculation debates. In 1936 his presidential address to the London Economic Club, published 1937 as 
Economics and Knowledge, marks both his methodological split with Mises and his new skepticism towards 
general equilibrium theory. During the late 1930s, he intensely works on capital theory, The Pure Theory of 
Capital of 1941 being the first and only volume of an uncompleted work on this field and simultaneously 
his last large work on “technical economics”.  Afterwards, the long journey towards his classical liberal 
social philosophy begins. 
 
Amid these highly complicated years of intellectual battle on manifold fronts, some first traces of ordo-
liberalism can be identified in Hayek’s widespread work. Two publications deserve special interest: 
Hayek’s editorship Collectivist Economic Planning of 193547 as well as his relatively unknown, short brochure 
Freedom and the Economic System of 1939.48
 
 
The 1935 volume is seen by a contemporary as “a formidable counter-attack by laissez-faire on all forms 
of planning, and in particular on Socialism”.49
                                                       
44 A colleague of mine from the Walter Eucken Institut in Freiburg, Ekkehard Köhler, is working currently on this 
topic. His research results seem to corroborate the Eucken-Hayek-Simons intellectual connection. 
 What is certainly true about this statement is that it was a 
formidable attack, since it took more than 10 years (if counted by The  Use of Knowledge in Society’s 
appearance 1945) of debate between Hayek and his intellectual enemies. However, the continuation of the 
sentence contains two improper claims: firstly that Hayek sees himself as a laissez-faire proponent and 
45 For positive mentionings of Simons in Eucken’s Principles, see Eucken (1952/04), p. 255, p. 260 as well as p. 269. 
46 Also, the upcoming Hayek-Popper relationship in the 1930s might bear some additional explanatory power. For 
this hint I am grateful to the participants of the PhD seminar at the University of Erfurt where I presented a 
preliminary version of this paper. I will consider the Hayek-Popper connection in further research on this complex 
issue of neo-liberalism in the 1930s. 
47 See Hayek (1935). Since Hayek’s own essays from this edited volume are reprinted in his Individualism and Economic 
Order which is better available today, the quotes will be based on the pagination from the latter volume. 
48 See Hayek (1939). The essay is reprinted in the Collected Works volume “Socialism and War” (Hayek (1997)), pp. 
189-212. 
49 See Dobb (1935), p. 532.   11 
secondly that it is an attack on all forms of planning. Let me thus quote the key passage of Hayek’s 
introductory essay to the volume: 
“To say that partial planning of the kind we are alluding to is irrational is, however, not equivalent 
to saying that the only form of capitalism which can be rationally advocated is that of complete 
laissez-faire in the old sense. There is no reason to assume that the historically given legal 
institutions are necessarily the most “natural” in any sense.”50
and further: 
 
“The question as to which is the most appropriate permanent framework which will secure the 
smoothest and most efficient working of competition is of the greatest importance and one 
which, it must be admitted, has been sadly neglected by economists.”51
 
 
These passages and the following paragraphs can in my opinion be seen as Hayek’s “third way” of the 
1930s, which in both wording and content is decidedly ordo-liberal. The term “framework” is, as 
mentioned above, the hallmark of the Freiburg paradigm. Besides, the framework must be “permanent” in 
Hayek’s words, i.e. not a play-ball of special interests but instead a durable construction. Its main purpose 
is to institutionalize competition, precisely as seen by the German ordo-liberals.  This  is  the type of 
“planning” which Hayek not only accepts but emphatically requires at this point of time and distinguishes 
it both from socialist planning and from the laissez-faire credo. Regard the closing sentences of this 
section of Hayek’s essay: 
“It is important to realize in any investigation of the possibilities of planning that it is a fallacy to 
suppose capitalism as it exists today is the alternative. We are certainly as far from capitalism in its 




Besides, it is noteworthy that in this phase Hayek seems skeptical of the appropriateness “historically 
given legal institutions”, which I see as the major difference between Hayek II and Hayek III. This will be 
detailed later in section 4.5. 
 
Is the conscious setup of a permanent, competition-enhancing framework what Hayek later terms 
“interventionist prejudices”? Possibly, but if yes, then his early economic philosophy of the 1930s and 
especially the 1940s is to be seen as highly interventionist. Interestingly, just before the above quoted 
paragraph, he is citing Mises’ Kritik des Interventionismus of 1929. 
 
Looking now at the second publication of the 1930s, Freedom and the Economic System of 1939, one can fully 
agree with H. D. Dickinson’s review which starts with the words:  
                                                       
50 See Hayek (1935/48), pp. 134-135. 
51 See Hayek (1935/48), p. 135. 
52 See Hayek (1935/48), p. 136.   12 
“This pamphlet is a manifesto, at once concise, cogent and eloquent, of individualistic 
individualism. It is a fundamental challenge to doctrine of liberal socialism”.53
 
   
The brochure is indeed a manifesto, and seen from the retrospect of Hayek’s following decades, it 
contains the core of many ideas which will be seminal for Hayek’s own evolution. In the end, the author 
of the review expresses his assessment that Hayek is at the beginning of a project in search for a “positive 
programme”: 




This assessment proves correct, Hayek dedicates the next half century precisely to this task. But what is 
the essence of the 1939 publication (note that it appears briefly after the 1938 Colloque Lippmann) and 
what of it can be interpreted as close to ordo-liberalism? 
 
Freedom and the Economic System can be seen as true intellectual forerunner of The Road to Serfdom. In fact, it 
contains the major ideas of the latter in a compact form. Hayek’s critique of National Socialism as the 
twin-brother of socialism proper, his overall discard of socialism and central planning, his ideas on the 
compatibility of democracy and capitalism are all to be found in this small booklet. And apart from that, 
the continuation of the thesis of the liberal economic framework from the 1935 is present and expanded. 
After the exposition of his socialism critique, Hayek indeed endeavors what Dickinson calls for, a 
“positive programme” for liberalism. It is a type of planning as “the application of reason to social 
problems in general”55
“We can “plan” a system of general rules, equally applicable to all people and intended to be 
permanent (even if subject to revision with the growth of knowledge), which provides an 
institutional framework within which the decisions as to what to do and how to earn a living are 
left to the individuals.”
 that Hayek opts for, or in other words “planning for freedom” as opposed to 
socialist or interventionist “planning for constant interference”. And this planning is again concentrated 




Thus precisely the ordo-liberal paradigm about the setup of the economic order as a permanent 
framework and the freedom of the economic process within this framework becomes directly visible. 
Note that in a later passage Hayek uses the term “construction of a rational framework”,57
                                                       
53 See Dickinson (1940), p. 435. 
 a term he 
would certainly no more use later when he criticizes rationalistic constructivism. But here, 1939, a 
construction seems not only to be possible but also necessary and can be seen as his main answer to the 
54 See Dickinson (1940), p. 437. 
55 See Hayek (1939), p. 10. 
56 See Hayek (1939), p. 8-9. 
57 See Hayek (1939), p. 10.   13 
objections by (market) socialists that he is only negative on their concepts but not inventive of a positive 
program. 
 
Also noteworthy in Freedom and the Economic System is Hayek’s criticism of classical liberalism on the issue 
of the institutional framework, precisely on the lines of Eucken’s critique of the classics that not any rule-
of-law automatically generates the competitive order: 
“Now it must be admitted that this task of creating a rational framework of law has by no means 
been carried through consistently by the early liberals… Yet it should have been obvious that the 
question of the exact content and the specific limitations of property rights, and how and when 
the state will enforce the fulfillment of contracts, require as much consideration on utilitarian 
grounds as the general principle.”58
 
  
Besides the plea for utilitarianism, still in the line of Mises, which he later rejects, the above quote clearly 
shows his proximity to the Freiburg stance that only specific types of rule-of-law are compatible with the 
proper economic order. Also, Hayek stresses that obviously the answers to these questions have not been 
discovered yet in his generation. The huge importance of the institutional framework question becomes 
visible in the end of this section on “planning for freedom”: 
“A certain dogmatism in this respect, which often had the appearance of an unwillingness to 
reason on these problems, brought the development of this kind of planning to an early standstill 
and has tended to throw the whole liberal doctrine into discredit.”59
 
  
This is ordo-liberalism at its best, both in the institutional content and in the critique of dogmatic laissez-
faire political economy of the 19th century. What happens to it later in Hayek’s evolution? 
 
4.4. The ordo-liberal climax in the 1940s 
Whereas the 1930s are the theoretically most challenging time in Hayek’s vita, the 1940s are seminal for 
his more “practical” or “political” mission to popularize liberalism to broader circles. Leaving technical 
economics almost entirely, he spends years on the manuscript of the small book which would make him 
famous: The Road to Serfdom. As he recalls later in the mentioned 1976 preface to a new edition: 
“But though I tried hard to get back to economics proper, I could not free myself of the feeling 
that the problem on which I had undesignedly embarked were more challenging and important 
than those of economic theory, and that much that I had said in my first sketch needed 
clarification and elaboration.”60
 
     
                                                       
58 See Hayek (1939), p. 11. 
59 See Hayek (1939), p. 11. 
60 See Hayek (1976/94), p. XXII.   14 
I  argue  that there is an ordo-liberal nucleus in The Road to Serfdom. First, Eucken’s idea of the 
interdependence between the legal and especially between the political and economic order can be seen as 
a foundation for Hayek’s main thesis: The tendency towards illiberty which planning causes in the 
economic order and which overburdens democracy in the political order can be seen as an 
implementation of Eucken’s interdependence thesis. 
 
But also regarding the role of government, Hayek holds on to the stand of thought which was identified in 
the 1930s papers. Again he maintains that a state as a rule-setter for the institutional framework of the 
economy is the seminal function which he attaches to the state in a liberal society. Imbedded in Hayek’s 
discourse with the socialist planners, he claims: 
“According to the modern planners, and for their purposes, it is not sufficient to design the most 
rational permanent framework within which the various activities would be conducted by 
different persons according to their individual plans.”61
 
 
He, just as the ordo-liberals, does not want to be seen as a defender of laissez-faire. Instead, “effective 
competition” is to be “created”62
“It [the liberal argument, SK] does not deny, but even emphasizes, that, in order that competition 
should work beneficially, a carefully thought-out legal framework is required and that neither the 
existing nor the past legal rules are free from grave defects.”




Summing up his conception on the institutions necessary from a liberal perspective, he claims: 
“The functioning of competition not only requires adequate organization of certain institutions 
like money, markets, and channels of information – some of which can never be adequately 
provided by private enterprise – but it depends, above all, on the existence of an appropriate legal 




A last quote, this time regarding the older liberalism and its relationship to institutions: 
“The systematic study of the forms of legal institutions which will make the competitive system 
work efficiently has been sadly neglected.”65
 
  
As noted in the introductory sections of the paper, it is precisely the combination of economic and legal 
expertise which is the “trademark” of the Freiburg School. Thus Hayek, who holds also a legal degree 
from Vienna University, obviously sees the symbiosis of legal and economic scholars as the prerequisite 
                                                       
61 See Hayek (1944/94), p. 40. 
62 See Hayek (1944/94), p. 41. 
63 See Hayek (1944/94), p. 41. 
64 See Hayek (1944/94), p. 43. 
65 See Hayek (1944/94), p. 43.   15 
for a renewal of classical liberalism. And thus, together with Röpke, he founds the Mont Pèlerin Society as 
precisely such a club. 
 
Before we come to the last text of Hayek’s “ordo-liberal 1940s”, it is worth mentioning that he had 
interesting correspondence with Eucken and Keynes on The Road to Serfdom, and it seems interesting that it 
is precisely the aforementioned aspect of the competition-enhancing framework which both Eucken and 
Keynes comment on. Both authors are generally laudable of Hayek’s book. But they are diametrically 
opposed to each other in their assessment of the role of the rule-of-law framework which Hayek 
proposes: Whereas Eucken presses for more elaboration of the framework idea to the Freiburg leitmotif 




In 1947, shortly after these turbulent years, the Mont Pèlerin Society is founded as a club of economists, 
jurists, philosophers and historians in order to reflect on the renewal of liberalism. Jokingly termed later by 
George Stigler as “The Friends of F.A. Hayek”, the Mont Pèlerin Society was founded as a  rather 
heterogeneous group of scholars, ranging from the social democratically inclined Maurice Allais and Karl 
Popper over the ordo-liberals Eucken and Röpke to free-market libertarians like Mises. This club has lived 
through a notable evolution since, many ordo-liberals exiting the society after the so-called “Hunold 
affair” of the late 1950s and early 1960s. After talking to Röpke’s nephew Professor Hans Willgerodt on 
this issue and re-reading the histories of the MPS, I tend to see this as a personal quarrel between liberal 
individualists, and not as a substantive dispute. It seems far-fetched that Hayek, after leaving his ordo-
liberal years to the past, went for an adjustment of the society away from German ordo-liberalism.  
 
Here, however, the founding of the MPS is of interest, and more specifically Hayek’s lecture entitled “Free 
Enterprise” and Competitive Order.67
“While it would be an exaggeration, it would not be altogether untrue to say that the 
interpretation of the fundamental principle of liberalism as absence of state activity rather than as 
a policy which deliberately adopts competition, the market, and prices as its ordering principle and 
uses the legal framework enforced by the state in order to make competition as effective and 
beneficial as possible – and to supplement it where, and only where, it cannot be made effective, 
 The similarities to the philosophies of Eucken and Röpke are significant, 
starting with the title itself: Hayek has obviously internalized Eucken’s advice towards the wording of the 
program as “competitive order”. Then, the following quotation can be seen as the essence of Hayek’s 
ordo-liberal neo-liberalism: 
                                                       
66 See Eucken (1946) and Keynes (1944). 
67 Hayek addresses the founding meeting (at least) twice. To what I refer here is not his formal opening address from 
April 1st which is reprinted i.a. in The Fortunes of Liberalism, but the substantive (unfortunately undated) input reprinted 
in Individualism and Economic Order.   16 
is as much responsible for the decline of competition as the active support which governments 
have given directly and indirectly to the growth of monopoly.”68
 
 
A truly long sentence. But its essence, that laissez-faire in the sense of non-action is responsible for the 
decline of competition (and thus to the decline of the attractiveness of liberalism) might sound insulting to 
e.g. the attending Mises. The whole presentation (I will spare further quotations) is a sign of reverence of 
Hayek to Eucken and, as he mentions explicitly, to the late Henry Simons.69
 
 Hayek in 1947 can be seen as 
a thorough ordo-liberal of the Freiburg type. 
4.5. Ordo-liberal traces in Hayek III 
Seen from the 1970s, Hayek can be perceived in a rather different manner. Erich Streissler in 1972 e.g. 
tries to discredit  Freiburg-type ordo-liberalism and its perception of competition policy precisely by 
contrasting it to Hayek.70 Paul Samuelson, in one of his last publications, characterizes Hayek outright as 
an “extremist”.71
 
 What happened in the meantime? Obviously Hayek III must be different. 
I must be brief on analyzing this part of Hayek’s transformation since this will be the next step in my 
research. For the time being, I can only formulate tentative hypotheses. Of them, I have two. 
 
The first guides to Hayek’s increasing involvement in the analysis of the Scottish Enlightment and its 
proponents. Already in the quoted essay volume Individualism and Economic Order from 1948, Hayek 
appraises highly Scottish philosophers like Smith, Hume and Ferguson and seems fascinated by their “true 
individualism”. It could be that his reading of these authors, but also of Burke, brought him to the “twin 
ideas” which then prevail in Hayek III: spontaneous order and cultural evolution. Besides, it might be that 
it is the course of this reading that, after Economics and Knowledge, leads him to sharpen his notion of 
competition to what later became the well-known metaphor of the “discovery procedure”. Traces of this 
notion of competition as a highly dynamic process are already discernible in his Princeton lecture The 
Meaning of Competition of 1946.72
                                                       
68 See Hayek (1947/48), p. 110. 
 Such an idea of the market process with the key element of the time factor 
makes the question of the appropriate framework, the core of the ordo-liberal Hayek II, a much more 
complicated issue. Thus, after the new stress on such a dynamic perspective on competition, a dynamized 
theory of order (i.e. of the framework surrounding competition) seems indispensable, and this is precisely 
the point where he re-invents the Scottish concepts of the spontaneous order and cultural evolution. So 
the first hypothesis is that it is the departure of static equilibrium (after 1936 and especially after 1946) and 
the new formulation of the dynamic notion of competition that lead him to the necessity to also dynamize 
his theory of order towards a spontaneous development of the framework instead of conscious setup. 
69 See Hayek (1947/48), p. 117. 
70 See Streissler (1972/73), pp. 1396-1402. 
71 See Samuelson (2009), p. 1. 
72 See Hayek (1946/48).   17 
The second source of departure from the early positions on the rational feasibility of the framework might 
be his involvement into neurobiology, the result of which was The Sensory Order of 1952. In this treatise, 
based on early ideas from the 1920s but formulated anew after the turbulent times of The Road to Serfdom, 
he develops his theory of human perception mechanisms and their boundaries. These new foundations 
for his upcoming social philosophy might have lead him to two other concepts seminal for his later 
projects: the rule-following behavior of individuals73 and the theory of complex phenomena. If The Sensory 
Order can be seen especially as the beginning of Hayek’s theory of complex phenomena, then its results 
might be an additional reason to depart from the idea of a designable framework for such phenomena.74
 
 
Hayek III is different, “more evolutionary” and undoubtedly more dynamic than in the 1930s and 1940s, 
possibly due to the two reasons/channels above. Is he in this sense not an ordo-liberal any more? I argue 
that he still can be seen as affiliated to ordo-liberalism, here however not any more as a Freiburgian but as 
an “extreme”75 or an “evolutionary”76
“…to provide a framework of legal rules within which the people can develop the monetary 
institutions that best suit them.”
 ordo-liberal. The argument that still some affinity to the ordo-
liberal program can be discerned is the rôle of rules which is overarching in the late Hayek. Certainly they 
are not any more to be consciously/rationally designed or constructed, as in Hayek’s above writings of the 
1930s and 1940s: that would be, in Hayek’s later wording, “constructivism”. But rules remain seminal, and 
thus the legal framework for the economy remains an important topic, both for The Constitution of Liberty 
and for Law, Legislation and Liberty. Interestingly, even in his “most evolutionary” years in which the 
denationalization of money is on his agenda, he sticks to the role of government in the denationalized 




That bears, despite all the transformations in the meantime, still some considerable proximity to Freiburg 







                                                       
73 For a recent extensive discussion of rule-following behavior in the light of The Sensory Order by a former PhD 
student of Viktor J. Vanberg, see Sprich (2008). 
74 For an estimation of the rôle of The Sensory Order as the birth and the foundation of Hayek’s theory of complex 
phenomena, see Streit (2004), p. 115. 
75 See Becker (1965), pp. 46-47. 
76 See Renner (2002), pp. 192-217. 
77 See Hayek (1976), p. 22.   18 
5. New look at the “curious relation” of Hayek and Mises 
The relationship of Hayek to his Viennese mentor Ludwig von Mises, a nexus which Hayek calls a 
“curious relation”,78
 
  has been covered extensively in literature: Both biographers of these prominent 
Austrian economists and secondary literature on their respective theories have dedicated a lot of attention 
to this complex tie. 
I believe, however, that the argument of an “ordo-liberal Hayek II” with remnants in Hayek to the end of 
his life can shed a very interesting new light on the “curious relation”. Adherents of Mises (sometimes 
peculiarly closer to Rothbard and anarchism than to Mises himself) often claim that Hayek represents an 
entirely different strand  in  the  Austrian  tradition, go beyond the legitimate Böhm-Bawerk/Wieser 
separation and argue that Hayek is a covert social democrat.79 Such interpretations are true to the extent 
that Hayek explicitly opposes the minimal state.80
 
 But they appear thoroughly absurd if one analyzes 
Hayek’s economic policy œuvre, his opposition to the ideal of social justice and his personal political 
involvement, be it in the Mont Pèlerin Society, in think tanks and as author of numerous letters to the editor 
of major European newspapers. 
Apart from these misinterpretations, the secondary literature on the comparison of two authors suffers 
from an additional weakness: Especially in recent comparative publications, the stress is rather isolated on 
the Mises’ and Hayek’s positions within the socialist calculation debates. The question of the role of 
government in their liberal programs, in contrast, seems to play a much less prominent part in literature. If 
this is analyzed in detail, sizable divergences between the two authors can be identified.81  These 
divergences certainly also call for an explanation and the truly necessary “de-homogenization” of Mises 
and Hayek in this respect. I have tried to work out this distinction by stressing that the topos in the 
respective  œuvre  is rather different:  Whereas Hayek stresses the problem of the constitutive lack of 
knowledge and signifies what institutions (most notably prices and general rules) are necessary to 
overcome this problem in a free society, for Mises individual transactions cannot be improved by any 
interference by government so that no freedom-enhancing rules can exist.82
                                                       
78 See Hayek (1994), p. 68. 
 The prism of Hayek being an 
ordo-liberal and contrasting him to Mises as an adherent of laissez-faire, analyzing from the perspective of 
the two topoi,  might thus bear considerable explanatory power for holding the two Viennese apart, 
leaving absurd accusations of Hayek being a covert social democrat and Mises being a covert anarchist 
aside. 
79 The most prominent proponent of this line of thought is Hans-Hermann Hoppe, see the above quoted statements 
in Hoppe (1994), pp. 68-70. 
80 See Hayek (1979/81), p. 41. 
81 I have discussed this comparative topic in a part of my PhD thesis which will soon be published as a discussion 
paper at HWWI/Wilhelm-Röpke-Institute Erfurt. 
82 This is absolutely not to say that Mises (unlike students of his) is an anarchist. He often refers to the necessary rôle 
of government being to guard “life, liberty and property” and distinguishes strictly liberalism from anarchism. 
Unfortunately, he to my knowledge never expresses what he precisely understands e.g. under property rights and 
how he delimits them.   19 
6. Outlook and further research 
I hope to have shown in the preceding sections that a new prism for viewing Friedrich von Hayek’s 
political economy might be helpful to clear several misunderstandings. If seen from an ordo-liberal 
perspective, his “interventionist” works in the 1930s and 1940s can be interpreted in a new light; but also 
his later studies on spontaneous orders and the cultural evolution of rules might win if his early ideas on 
the necessity of a framework are worked out, so that e.g. interpretative deadlocks as the accusation of 
being a “social Darwinist” could be clarified. Last but not least, the divergences in the relationship Hayek-
Mises might to some extent be explained by their deviating attitude towards ordo-liberalism, which Mises 
pejoratively calls “ordo-interventionism”. 
 
The present paper could of course not answer all questions. Most importantly, (at least) three areas remain 
which will be targeted in further research. First the complex interdependencies within early neo-liberalism 
seem worthwhile exploring, i.e. the mutual influences between Hayek and the early Chicago School or 
between Hayek and Karl Popper. Such an analysis might shed some additional light on the formation of 
the ordo-liberal Hayek II. For this, also a detailed look at the correspondence of the involved protagonists 
seems necessary. Secondly, the reasons for the transformation from Hayek II to Hayek III must be 
elaborated, which here could only be formulated as hypotheses as to the  influence by the  Scottish 
Enlightment and the rôle of The Sensory Order. Thirdly, the interaction of the ordo-liberal phase and 
Hayek’s knowledge topos needs an additional clarification since Hayek II is also the time-span in which 
Economics and Knowledge and The Use of Knowledge in Society appear. 
 
“Eucken must come to America”, a German professor of economics claimed recently,83
                                                       
83 See the statement of Professor Hans-Werner Sinn in the German weekly Wirtschaftwoche on March 30 2009. 
 meaning that a 
seminal answer to the current global crisis might be found in the philosophy of ordo-liberalism. With this 
paper I tried to argue that not only Walter Eucken but also his close friend Friedrich von Hayek, especially 
in his ordo-liberal phase, definitely deserves a new reading. Historians of economic thought seem to suit 
well as the forerunner here.   20 
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